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INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) performs a
critical, but often overlooked, function in civil disputes. It imposes a
“signing requirement” on attorneys.1 The rule requires attorneys to
certify that their pleadings and motions have a proper purpose by
providing their signature as a stamp of approval.2 By endorsing filings
with their signature, attorneys attest that the claims they are submitting
on behalf of their clients are supported by law or a good faith
extension of the law3 and bolstered by evidence.4 Though the signing
requirement may appear to be little more than a procedural formality,
“[t]here may be no better example than Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 . . . of how the law of civil procedure has influenced the
legal profession.”5


J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
5
Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589
(1998).
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“[F]ederal courts exercise considerable discretion and great power
. . . essential in preserving the rule of law and the rights and liberties of
the American people, in cases large and small, landmark and
mundane.”6 When a party invokes these powers in a civil case, it
ignites a “powerful, intimidating, and often expensive” legal process
that is often vulnerable to abuse by litigants.7 This is in part because
meritless pleadings are distracting, costly, and an impediment to swift
justice.8 Despite the common misconception, Rule 11 is more than a
toothless, guiding principle. Rather, it regulates attorney conduct by
discouraging them from pursuing “baseless filings” that can bungle
proceedings in federal court.9
Rule 11’s regulatory might is rooted in the discretion it gives
district court judges to levy sanctions.10 Rule 11(c) provides that “the
court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm,
or party that violate[s] the rule or is responsible for the violation.”11
The rule encourages thorough pre-filing investigation by attorneys
when analyzing their clients’ claims.12 To avoid sanctions, lawyers
and their clients must limit their pleadings and motions to those
reasonably supported by the law.13 The threat of sanctions can be
“petrifying” for attorneys.14 The very existence of Rule 11 is a
constant reminder of the problems that fester within the federal civil

6

Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 883 (7th
Cir. 2017).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 883-84.
9
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
10
Id. at 399.
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
12
Melissa L. Stuart, A Young Lawyer’s Guide to Rule 11 Sanctions,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (June 20, 2012),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialpractice/articles/spring2012young-lawyers-guide-rule11-sanctions.html
13
Id.
14
Id.
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litigation system.15 It serves as “a model and potent tool” for deterring
and sanctioning misconduct during the early stages of litigation.16
There is currently a circuit split among the United States courts of
appeals about the procedure attorneys must follow to trigger sanctions
against opposing counsel.17 A plain reading of the rule suggests that
attorneys must serve a motion upon opposing counsel before filing for
sanctions with the court pursuant to Rule 11.18 This “warning shot”
provides targeted parties and their legal counsel an opportunity to seek
“safe harbor” by correcting or withdrawing sanctionable pleadings.19
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits are unified in demanding strict compliance with this
procedure.20 The Seventh Circuit, however, has developed precedent
that mere “substantial compliance” is sufficient.21 In Northern Illinois
Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit was presented
with an opportunity to clarify its position. Part I of this note discusses
the origins of Rule 11 and explores how the rule has transformed since
its inception. Part II takes a deeper look at how substantial compliance
became controlling precedent in the Seventh Circuit and why other
circuits have chosen not to adopt the same approach. Part III discusses
the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Northern Illinois Telecom v.
PNC Bank, N.A. Part IV analyzes the decision and explores the
arguments for and against the strict and substantial compliance
interpretations of Rule 11. And, finally, Part V provides a brief

15

GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 2 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3rd ed. 2004).
16
Id. at 2.
17
Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539,
542 (7th Cir. 2011).
18
Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 767 (6th
Cir. 2014); Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006).
19
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 882 (7th
Cir. 2017).
20
Penn, 773 F.3d at 768.
21
Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 553 (7th Cir. 2011); Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee
County, 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003).

195

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

summation of the note and assesses the likely future of the “substantial
compliance” rule in the Seventh Circuit.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Rule 11, at its simplest, is an effort to ensure that attorneys act
responsibly while advancing their clients’ interests.22 The threat of
sanctions, however, has not always been a factor that attorneys have
seriously considered when drafting pleadings.23 Over time, a series of
amendments to the rule have manipulated the firmness with which
courts have applied it. In its original form, Rule 11 was little more
than a wispy, rarely applied promise.24 But, it quickly evolved into a
disruptive armament wielded by litigators after it was amended in
1983.25 This radical transformation incited the adoption of a safe
harbor requirement26 which is still taking shape today.
A. Pre-1983 Amendments
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938.27
Rule 11, in both its original and current form, requires attorneys to
sign the pleadings, motions, and other filings they submit to the court
on behalf of their clients.28 The signature is an act of “certification”
that is meant to provide the court confidence that attorneys are
pursuing legitimate, actionable claims.29 From the outset, Rule 11

22

Vairo, supra note 15, at 5-6.
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 885 (7th
Cir. 2017).
24
Vairo, supra note 15, at 9-10.
25
Id. at 19-20.
26
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
27
Vairo, supra note 15, at 5.
28
Id. at 5-6.
29
Id.
23
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provided federal district courts considerable discretion to impose
sanctions on attorneys that violated the rule’s mandate.30
The debut of Rule 11 was not the first codified attempt to deter
attorneys from pursuing frivolous claims.31 As early as the midnineteenth century, Judge Joseph Story championed a theory that the
adoption of an attorney signing requirement would ensure that
lawsuits were well-grounded in facts and the law.32 Rule 24 of the
Federal Equity Rules of 1842 embraced Story’s recommendation by
requiring pleadings to contain the signature of the presenting
attorney.33 Similarly, Rule 11 was not the first attempt to sanction
attorney conduct.34 28 U.S.C. § 1927 allowed judges the discretion to
penalize attorneys who were found to have “unreasonably” inflated the
cost of litigation.35 Yet in comparison with its predecessors, Rule 11
promised a more direct path for judges to sanction attorneys who
advanced claims that were frivolous or brought for another improper
purpose, like delay or the inflation of expenses for the opposing
party.36 The early supporters of Rule 11 had two goals: first, to create
an environment that cultivated honest attorneys; and, second, to
“streamline the litigation process.”37
Rule 11 was ineffective at achieving the idealistic expectations
that cultivated it. The primary issue underlying Rule 11’s initial
ineffectiveness was that it held attorneys to a good-faith standard.38
Sanctions were only justified if, in the eyes of the judge, the targeted
attorney could not muster a “good faith argument” in support of his or

30

Vairo, supra note 15, at 5-6.
Id.
32
JARED S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, RULE 11 AND OTHER
SANCTIONS: NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION 15-16 (1987).
33
Id.
34
Vairo, supra note 15, at 5-6.
35
Id.
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
37
Id.
38
Vairo, supra note 15, at 7.
31
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her potentially infringing filing.39 This standard was too subjective and
proved to be too flimsy to function as an useful deterrent.40 Instead,
Rule 11 was a source of “considerable confusion” that failed to
significantly curtail abuses.41 There were “only a handful” of decisions
that involved Rule 11 sanctions between its enactment in 1938 and
1983.42
B. 1983 Amendments
Rule 11 was amended for the first time in 1983.43 With the rule’s
shortcomings in mind, the Advisory Committee set out to make the
rule a more potent force in preventing litigation abuses by reducing
“reluctance” to impose sanctions.44 The drafters of the revisions took
an aggressive stance against attorney misconduct. The Advisory
Committee stressed that the courts needed to play a more active role in
the “detection” of violations and explicitly encouraged “punishment”
of infringing attorneys.45
Perhaps the most impactful change to Rule 11 was the adoption of
a new standard of conduct.46 The rule, in its original form, was
criticized as too “vague and subjective” because its “good-faith”
standard tilted the benefit of doubt in favor of infringing parties and
attorneys.47 To cure this perceived flaw, the drafters of the amendment
heightened the standard from mere good-faith to the more objective
reasonableness under the circumstances standard.48 The Advisory
Committee intended this change to provide judges with a more
39

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990).
Vairo, supra note 15, at 7.
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
42
Vairo, supra note 15, at 47.
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Vairo, supra note 15, at 7.
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
40
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objective lens through which to analyze attorney conduct and to
broaden the “range of circumstances” that would trigger sanctions.49
Additionally, Rule 11 underwent a series of textual changes that
sent the message to judges that they needed to impose sanctions more
frequently.50 First, the drafters included the word “sanctions” in the
text of the rule for the first time.51 The new rule “expressly allowed for
the imposition of expenses, including . . . reasonable attorneys’
fees.”52 This strategic addition solidified a new commitment to
penalizing attorneys for violating Rule 11.53 Second, the drafters
removed a provision that allowed judges to simply strike improper
motions and pleadings.54 This provision was “confusing” and rarely
used.55 Most importantly, the rule was redrafted to include the phrase
“shall impose.”56 The new version of Rule 11 tasked judges with an
affirmative duty to impose sanctions for violations where they once
had discretion.57
When the 1983 Amendments took effect, some feared that Rule
11 would continue to be ignored, while others argued that it was still
too subjective.58 Others feared that the drastic changes would lead the
rule to be aggressively over-applied in unintended ways.59 In 1990, the
United States Supreme Court tackled concerns about Rule 11
sanctions in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. In Cooter & Gell, the
Court considered whether a district court could rightfully impose
sanctions on a plaintiff who voluntarily withdrew a frivolous

49

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Vairo, supra note 15, at 11.
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
54
Id.
55
Vairo, supra note 15, at 11.
56
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
57
Id.
58
Vairo, supra note 15, at 13.
59
Id. at 12-15.
50
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complaint.60 The Court held that judges were required to impose
sanctions even where the filing at issue was voluntarily withdrawn or
corrected.61 The Supreme Court clung to a “plain meaning”
interpretation of Rule 11; judges, the Court held, did not have the
discretion to waive sanctions.62 Though the court embraced a blackletter interpretation of Rule 11, it did not hesitate to identify the rule’s
shortcomings, noting that it “must be read in light of concerns that it
will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy . . . .”63
C. 1993 Amendments
The fear that Rule 11 would be “overused” following the 1983
revisions quickly became a reality.64 Over 650 Rule 11 hearings were
held and recorded between the adoption of the 1983 amendments and
December 1987, a substantial increase from the “handful” of decisions
recorded in the previous era.65 The revisions were criticized as an
“over-correction.”66 As Rule 11 began facing harsh criticism,
momentum started to build for a new set of amendments.67 An interim
report that highlighted the flaws of the 1983 revisions was compiled.68
According to the report, Rule 11 chilled attorney creativity,
discouraged the pursuit of novel arguments, created substantial delays
in proceedings, and was being applied inconsistently by judges.69 Most
notably, Rule 11 was criticized for exacerbating the “contentious and
uncooperative behavior” during litigation that the rule was originally
60

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 388 (1990).
Id. at 398.
62
Id. at 392.
63
Id. at 393.
64
Vairo, supra note 15, at 13.
65
Id. at 47.
66
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 885 (7th
Cir. 2017).
67
Vairo, supra note 15, at 15.
68
Id. at 14.
69
Id. at 19-20.
61
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enacted to prevent.70 The interim report made it clear that there was a
need for further revisions.71 It showed that only 20% of judges favored
a retreat to the pre-1983 status quo.72 The Advisory Committee for the
1993 amendments needed to discover a middle ground. Rule 11
required balance.
The 1993 amendments “intended to remedy problems” that arose
with the “interpretation and application of the 1983 revision . . . ."73
Specifically, the committee wanted to “place greater constraints on the
imposition of sanctions” in order to “reduce the number of motions for
sanctions” that were delaying proceedings.74 Accordingly, the
committee set out to tighten the spigot on the gush of sanctions that
were flooding the courts by retreating from the hard line approach it
embraced only ten years prior.75 Judges were once again granted
“significant discretion” in determining whether sanctions were
warranted and, if so, how harsh they should be on a case by case
basis.76 The mandate that judges “shall impose” sanctions was relaxed
to an instruction that they “may impose” them.77 Ultimately, the
committee settled on a softer, more lenient position.78 This, it was
believed, signaled to judges and attorneys that they should be “less
zealous in using Rule 11” during litigation, especially “where there
were relatively minor infractions . . . .”79
Further, the revised Rule 11 included a new provision that
mandated advance notice of impending sanctions to attorneys that
risked facing sanctions before they could be imposed.80 This
70

Vairo, supra note 15, at 19.
Id.
72
Id.
73
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
78
Vairo, supra note 15, at 32.
79
Id.
80
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
71
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procedural hurdle was added to provide at-risk attorneys an
“opportunity to respond” to opposing parties that threatened
sanctions.81 All “requests for sanctions” required a separate motion to
be served on attorneys to warn them that sanctions were being
threatened.82 This practice, the committee hoped, would provide
potentially infringing attorneys a chance to correct or withdraw their
pleadings and avoid triggering costly satellite litigation.83
More precisely, the revised Rule 11 required attorneys who
intended to pursue sanctions to wait at least 21 days after service
before officially filing the motion with the court.84 This addition to the
Rule was intended to provide a “warning shot” to attorneys who might
be in violation of the rule a chance to seek safe harbor.85 It, in turn,
provided lawyers security form sanctions by giving them an
opportunity to re-certify their filings.86
The safe harbor provision was adopted to fulfill the “streamlining
purpose originally envisioned by the 1983 architects of Rule 11.”87
The new rule imposed a 21 day safe harbor period.88 Though this
would cause minor delays, it would save time and costs in the
aggregate because it allowed attorneys to abandon frivolous claims
and avoid triggering even more time consuming and costly satellite
litigation.89 The 1993 amendment refocused the purpose of Rule 11 as
a mechanism for clarifying the issues and merits of the case rather than
a mechanism to punish attorneys.90 By allowing safe harbor, Rule 11
finally found the appropriate balance needed to effectively combat
frivolous motions and pleadings.
81

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Vairo, supra note 15, at 32.
88
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
90
Id.
82
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II. HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
The 1993 amendments drew back the “fangs” of Rule 11.91
After the changes took effect, district courts quickly aligned with the
new rule’s “relax[ed]” standards of liability,92 and the circuit courts
began to reinforce that sanctions were again discretionary, not
mandatory.93 The adjustments to the rule were successful at placing
new constraints on judge’s ability to impose sanctions.94 But, the new
Rule 11 was not immune to criticism or confusion. Some judges
reacted unfavorably to the new safeguards.95 This distaste materialized
in the Seventh Circuit’s unique interpretation of the safe harbor
provision.
A. Emergence of Substantial Compliance
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit adopted a novel interpretation of
Rule 11 when resolving an appeal of a district court decision that
denied sanctions. In Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, the plaintiff
brought a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against his government employer
for allegedly violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.96
Nisenbaum, a security supervisor for Milwaukee County, argued that
he was improperly stripped of his job as retaliation because he ran for
County Clerk.97 The magistrate judge and the Seventh Circuit agreed
that Nisenbaum’s claims were patently frivolous because the county
passed a budget that phased out Nisenbaum’s position before he began

91

Pierre v. Inroads, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 769, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
Vairo, supra note 15, at 77.
93
Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994).
94
Vairo, supra note 15, at 77-80.
95
Knipe, 867 F. Supp. at 763 n. 12.
96
Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2003).
97
Id. at 806.
92
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his candidacy.98 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with the
magistrate judge on whether sanctions were warranted.99
The magistrate judge determined that Nisenbaum’s claim was
“frivolous from the get-go” and was sanctionable under Rule 11(c),100
but refused to enforce sanctions because the defendants failed to
adhere to the procedure required by Rule 11(c)(2) which states that a
motion must be served on a party facing sanctions.101 Milwaukee
County did not serve Nisenbaum with a motion nor did it file a motion
with the district court.102 Instead, the county simply sent Nisenbaum’s
attorney a letter in which it threatened sanctions.103 Despite the
warning, Nisenbaum’s attorney proceeded with his plaintiff’s
claims.104
When explaining the denial of sanctions, the magistrate judge
noted that his decision to do so was “technical” because if the
defendant provided notice by service of a motion, then sanctions
would have been warranted.105 The Seventh Circuit disagreed. “A
serious request for sanctions is entitled to more than a brushoff,” wrote
Circuit Judge Easterbrook.106 On review, the Seventh Circuit
remanded the case to the court below with instruction that the
defendants were “entitled to a decision on the merits of their request
for sanctions.”107 The court reconciled the lack of procedural
compliance with the safe harbor provision by finding that the
defendants “complied substantially” with Rule 11(c)(2).108 By
providing informal notice to Nisenbaum and giving him 21 days to
98

Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 807.
Id. at 808.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 811.
107
Id. at 808.
108
Id.
99
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correct or withdraw his claim, Milwaukee County was compliant with
Rule 11.109
The Seventh Circuit has consistently recognized substantial
compliance with Rule 11(c) as sufficient grounds for sanctions.110 The
court explained the merits of a substantial compliance approach in
Matrix IV, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago.111
In Matrix IV, the plaintiff brought a common law fraud claim against
the defendant in district court even though a similar fraud claim had
already failed in bankruptcy court.112 The district court found against
Matrix IV, Inc. (“Matrix”) on the grounds of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.113 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that
the suit was properly dismissed.114 The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the district court that sanctions were not warranted in Matrix IV, but
did so on different grounds.115
In district court, Matrix was spared the burden of sanctions
because the defendant’s method of notice was “procedurally
defective.”116 Notice was sent to Matrix in the form of a letter from
opposing counsel explicitly threatening sanctions against Matrix if the
claims against the defendant were not dismissed.117 The letter was sent
almost two years prior to the eventual dismissal of the claim, and the
defendants, in turn, moved for sanctions three weeks after the

109

Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808.
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 886-87
(7th Cir. 2017).; Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649
F.3d 539, 552 (7th Cir. 2011); Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808.
111
Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 552; see also Fabriko Acquisition Crop v. Prokos,
536 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing that an informal letter is sufficient to
start the “21-day window to withdraw or correct the claim” so long as a formal
motion is submitted to the court to trigger sanctions).
112
Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 541-42.
113
Id. at 542.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 552.
116
Id.
117
Id.
110
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dismissal.118 Though the defendants did not serve Matrix with an
official motion at least 21 days prior to filing for sanctions, the
Seventh Circuit ruled for the defendants, stating “motions for
sanctions are permissible so long as the moving party substantially
complies with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.”119 In this case, like
in Nisenbaum, the Seventh Circuit held that the method of notice was
sufficient to serve as proper notice and trigger sanctions.120 Though
the court ultimately agreed with the district court that sanctions were
not warranted, the decision turned on substantive rather than
procedural grounds.121
B. Opposition to Substantial Compliance
The Seventh Circuit is currently the only circuit that recognizes
substantial compliance with Rule 11(c)(2).122 It is the only circuit to
recognize that proper notice can come in the form of an informal
letter.123 Most other circuits require strict compliance based on the
plain language of the rule, but some circuits have not yet addressed
this question.124
Substantial compliance has been met by other circuits with
disapproval. In Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179 (2006), the Tenth Circuit
explicitly rejected and openly criticized the substantial compliance
test.125 There, the plaintiff alleged that a “stop and search” performed
by police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights.126 The court
118

Id.
Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539,
552 (7th Cir. 2011).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 881 (7th
Cir. 2017).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006).
119
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held that the plaintiff failed to establish a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.S. §
1983.127 Defense counsel sent informal warning letters more than 21
days before filing for Rule 11 sanctions with the court,128 yet defense
counsel never officially served the plaintiff’s with a motion in
compliance with Rule 11(c)(2).129 In its decision, the Roth court
considered whether substantial compliance with Rule 11 could be
enough to impose sanctions, but ultimately sided against the Seventh
Circuit by determining that strict compliance with Rule 11(c)(2) was
necessary.130 It found Nisenbaum to be “unpersuasive . . . because it
contain[ed] no analysis of the language of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or the
Advisory Committee Notes, cite[d] to no authority for its holding, and
indeed [was] the only published circuit decision reaching such a
conclusion.”131
Similarly, Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., a Sixth Circuit
case, also explicitly rejected and openly criticized the substantial
compliance test, instead favoring strict compliance and a plain reading
interpretation of Rule 11.132 It roundly criticized the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Nisenbaum for its failure to “address any of the textual or
policy concerns . . . and other circuits roundly criticize the decision's
cursory reasoning.”133
III. NORTHERN ILLINOIS TELECOM, INC. V. PNC BANK, N.A.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit was presented an opportunity to
review its stance on Rule 11(c)(2). Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v.
PNC Bank, N.A. presented the question whether informal letters that
threaten sanctions can substantially comply with the safe harbor
127

Id.
Roth, 466 F.3d at 1185.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1193.
131
Id.
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Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp., 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th
Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 768.
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provision when the letters do not explicitly specify that plaintiff’s
counsel has 21 days to correct or withdraw the pleadings and when
defense counsel neglects to serve the targeted party with a formal
motion.134 Ultimately, the court held that letters threatening sanctions
do not substantially comply with Rule 11(c)(2) if they do not expressly
offer 21 days safe harbor to attorneys.135
A. Facts of the Case
In 2007, MidAmerica Bank merged with National City Bank.136
As part of the transition, Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. (NITEL) was
subcontracted to outfit four branches owned by these banks in the
Chicagoland area with communications cabling.137 The contractor for
the project, Nexxtworks, determined that there were “quality
problems” with the installation at the four branches and withheld a
portion of the payment promised to NITEL for failure to perform.138
As a result, other subcontractors needed to be hired to correct and
complete NITEL’s work.139 In 2009, Nexxtworks filed for bankruptcy
and listed the contested amount as disputed debt.140 NITEL sought to
recover $115,000 in bankruptcy court, but the claim was dismissed
because NITEL missed the deadline.141 In the interim, each of the
bank branches where the work was performed was acquired by PNC
Bank, N.A. (PNC Bank).142

134

NITEL, 850 F.3d at 881-82.
Id. at 888.
136
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL I), No. 12 C
2372, 2014 WL 4244069 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 27, 2014).
137
Id. at *1.
138
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 882 (7th
Cir. 2017).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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Id.
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In 2012, NITEL filed a breach of contract claim against PNC
Bank seeking to recover $81,300 for the work performed plus fees and
costs.143 PNC Bank, as defendant, successfully removed the case from
state court to the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
because there was complete diversity of citizenship between the
parties and the amount in controversy was greater than $75,000.144
PNC Bank moved for summary judgment arguing that neither it, nor
any of the bank branches it acquired, actually entered into a contract
with NITEL.145 The contracts at issue, PNC Bank contended, were
between NITEL and Nexxtworks.146 District Judge Amy J. St. Eve
agreed147 finding that NITEL “failed to submit any evidence that a
contract existed” with PNC Bank or its predecessors.148 Accordingly,
summary judgment was granted for PNC Bank because NITEL failed
to establish a “genuine issue of material fact.”149
The district court’s grant of summary judgment did not conclude
litigation, however. In a footnote, District Judge St. Eve noted that that
defense counsel “might seek sanctions under Rule 11.”150 During
discovery, PNC Bank’s attorney, Jim Crowley, threatened sanctions
against NITEL and plaintiff’s counsel, Robert Riffner, twice. 151 On
July 31, 2012, Crowley wrote his first letter to Riffner.152 The letter
explained that it was apparent that NITEL never contracted with PNC
Bank or any of its predecessors and unless the complaint was
dismissed the defendants would pursue “sanctions under Federal Rule

143

Id.
NITEL, 850 F.3d at 882.
145
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL I), No. 12 C
2372, 2014 WL 4244069 at *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 27, 2014).
146
Id. at *4.
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Id. at *5.
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Id.
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Id. at *5 n.3.
151
Id. at *1-2.
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Id. at *1.
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11 against NITEL and your firm . . . .”153 The defendant filed a motion
to compel discovery.154 In March 2013, the magistrate judge who
presided over the hearing determined that NITEL had the burden of
proof to provide evidence that it entered into a contract with PNC
Bank.155 On April 2, 2013, Crowley wrote a second letter warning
Riffner that defense counsel intended to move for summary judgment
and Rule 11 sanctions.156 The letter alleged that the claim was
“frivolous” and, for that reason, Riffner never should have accepted
the case.157 Riffner did not respond to either letter.158
District Judge Robert Blakey of the Northern District of Illinois
held that sanctions were warranted on both substantive159 and
procedural160 grounds.161 First, on the merits, the claim was clearly
frivolous.162 NITEL maintained throughout the litigation that they
contracted with PNC, but failed to provide even a shred of useful
evidence supporting the claim.163 Second, in terms of procedure, PNC
gave sufficient notice to NITEL because it substantially complied with
Rule 11(c)(2).164 Summary judgment was granted on August 27, 2014,
and on October 21, 2014 PNC Bank filed a motion for Rule 11
sanctions against NITEL and Riffner.165 Crowley warned Riffner
twice, first in 2012, and again on April 2, 2013, thereby providing
Riffner far more time than the 21 days of safe harbor demanded under
153
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Id. at *2.
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Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL II), No. 12 C
2372, 2015 WL 1943271 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 29, 2015).
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Rule 11(c)(2). Crowley, however, never served NITEL with a formal
motion threatening sanctions.166 Further, Crowley did not specify in
either letter how much time NITEL had to withdraw or correct its
pleadings before he would seek to pursue sanctions.167 But according
to Seventh Circuit precedent “substantial compliance may be
enough.”168
B. Hamilton’s Majority
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision imposing sanctions.169 According to Circuit Judge Hamilton,
who wrote for the majority, the sanctions were improper even though
the Seventh Circuit is uniquely lenient when assessing compliance
with Rule 11(c)(2).170 The court held that the letters sent by PNC
Bank’s counsel to Riffner fell “far short” of substantial compliance
with the safe harbor requirement.171
Riffner appealed on both substantive and procedural grounds.172
He needed to establish an abuse of discretion by the district court
judge on either basis to reverse the district court’s decision.173 First,
the court confidently affirmed that the sanctions were substantively
justified.174 NITEL’s position that PNC Bank was liable for breach of
contract was “objectively baseless” because no contract ever existed
between the parties.175 The claim was frivolous and, thus, violated
Rule 11(b)(2).
166

Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 886 (7th
Cir. 2017).
167
Id. at 889.
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NITEL II, 2015 WL 1943271 at *4.
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NITEL, 850 F.3d at 888.
170
Id.
171
Id. at *883.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.

211

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

19

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

The court then probed the procedural merits of Riffner’s appeal. In
the opinion, Hamilton first addressed whether PNC Bank strictly
complied with Rule 11.176 The two letters sent from PNC Bank’s
attorney to Riffner “simply did not comply” with Rule 11(c)(2).177 The
rule requires the party seeking sanctions to serve the targeted party
with a motion threatening sanctions.178 The threatening party then
must wait at least 21 days after providing notice of impending
sanctions before filing the motion with the court to allow the targeted
party an opportunity to correct or withdraw the contested filing.179
PNC Bank never served NITEL or Riffner with a motion.180 In most
circuits, the analysis would have ended here.
But, in accordance with circuit precedent, the court then analyzed
whether the two letters that PNC Bank’s attorney sent to Riffner
substantially complied with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.181
Though the district court ruled that PNC Bank's two “settlement
offers” sent to Riffner were “sufficient warning shots” to establish
substantial compliance with Rule 11, the Seventh Circuit disagreed.182
According to Hamilton, “[t]he Rule 11 threats did not transform PNC
Bank’s settlement offers into communications that substantially
complied” with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.183 Though he did
not provide detail, Hamilton indicated that to be substantially
compliant with Rule 11, a letter that threatens sanctions must establish
that the “opposing party is serious” and also specify “when the 21-day
safe-harbor clock starts to run.”184
Hamilton did not stop at reversing the district court’s decision to
sanction Riffner. Though the court decided this case within the
176

NITEL, 850 F.3d at 886.
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framework of existing Seventh Circuit precedent, Hamilton was
candid about his reservations against the substantial compliance
interpretation of Rule 11(c)(2) moving forward. The final footnote of
the decision warned that those who “rely on a theory of substantial
compliance should understand that, at least in the present landscape,
they are inviting possible en banc and/or Supreme Court review of the
question.”185
C. Posner’s Dissent
Former Circuit Judge Posner responded with a brief, scathing
dissent that criticized the majority opinion and disparaged Riffner.
Posner scorned at his colleague’s hesitancy to “punish misbehaving
lawyers . . . .”186 Riffner was a “boor”, Posner accused. His pursuit of
such a hopelessly frivolous claim, and his failure to respond to
multiple settlement offers presented by PNC Bank justified the
imposition of sanctions.187
Posner felt that the case presented a “good example of substantial
compliance” and, therefore, he would have affirmed the district court
judge’s decision to impose sanctions.188 Posner argued that the letters
sent by PNC Bank demanding withdrawal of the lawsuit were
sufficient to provide Riffner notice of impending sanctions.189 Though
PNC failed to serve Riffner with a motion as required by Rule
11(c)(2), the letters “were the equivalent of Rule 11 motions.”190

185

NITEL, 850 F.3d at 889 n.5.
NITEL, 850 F.3d at 889 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
In NITEL, the Seventh Circuit had the chance clear up the
confusion surrounding its unique, controversial interpretation of the
safe harbor provision. But, ultimately, it balked at the opportunity.
A. NITEL’s Shortcomings
The court could have overturned past precedent. The Seventh
Circuit has subscribed to a substantial compliance interpretation of
Rule 11 since Nisenbaum.191 A decision to overturn the court’s current
commitment to substantial compliance would have aligned the
Seventh Circuit with every other circuit that has addressed this
issue.192 To do so, the court could have determined that the letters sent
from Crowley to Riffner were in fact substantially compliant with
Rule 11(c)(2), but that substantial compliance is, and always has been,
an improper reading of the rule.
The letters at issue in NITEL seemed to be substantially compliant
with Rule 11(c)(2). The first letter from Crowley to Riffner “offered to
settle the matter in exchange for a dismissal order and a check to cover
PNC’s attorney fees and costs. . . .”193 A failure to comply, Crowley
threatened, would prompt PNC to seek “sanctions under Federal Rule
11 . . . .”194 This letter was sent to Riffner on July 31, 2012.195
Crowley sent another letter that was functionally the same as the first
one on April 2, 2013.196 The letters explicitly threatened that Rule 11
sanctions would be pursued if the NITEL did not withdraw or correct

191

NITEL, 850 F.3d at 881.
Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th
Cir. 2014).
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its pleading.197 NITEL had more than 21 days to withdraw or correct
its pleading. PNC Bank moved for summary judgment on September
8, 2013 and filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions on October 21,
2014.198 More than two years elapsed between the first explicit, but
informal, threat of sanctions and PNC Bank’s motion for summary
judgment. Nonetheless, the court held that the procedure fell “far
short” of substantial compliance.199
Alternatively, the court could have doubled down on its
commitment to substantial compliance. Based on the explicit threats
for Rule 11 sanctions communicated in Crowley’s letters and the
extensive time allowed by Crowley before moving for summary
judgment and sanctions, the court could have affirmed the district
court’s decision by holding that the letters were substantially
compliant with Rule 11(c)(2). By specifically identifying why
Crowley’s letters were substantially compliant with the Rule, the court
could have provided the clarity that the substantial compliance
interpretation has always lacked. Additionally, the court could have
laid out its policy arguments supporting the merits of the substantial
compliance interpretation. NITEL provided the Seventh Circuit an
opportunity to supply the justification for substantial compliance it has
always neglected to provide.
Instead, the court settled on a limited, narrow holding. The court
reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that Crowley’s informal
letters to Riffner were not substantially compliant with Rule
11(c)(2).200 By reversing, the court affirmed circuit precedent.
Substantial compliance is still the controlling theory in the Seventh
Circuit.201 Of course, providing narrow decisions is within the court’s
right. But in this case, the Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to
explain the merits of substantial compliance.
197
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By neglecting to clarify why Crowley’s letters fell short of
substantial compliance, it missed an important opportunity to provide
guidance to litigating attorneys and district courts judges tasked with
enforcing the standard. The court’s sheepishness in NITEL generated
confusion for district court judges. Recently in Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc.,
Judge Feinerman of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
highlighted the mixed message that the Seventh Circuit sent to the
lower courts with NITEL. Citing Matrix IV, Judge Fienerman noted
that “a letter informing the opposing party of the intent to seek
sanctions and the basis for the imposition of sanctions . . . is sufficient
for Rule 11 purposes.”202 But, the Seventh Circuit appeared to be
“within a cat’s whisker of overruling [substantial compliance]” in
NITEL.203 Since substantial compliance remains precedent, the judge
concluded that he “must follow it until the Seventh Circuit says
otherwise.”204
Knapp proves that district courts within the Seventh Circuit are
being held hostage by the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to clarify its
substantial compliance doctrine. There are no clear benchmarks that
separate letters that are substantially compliant with Rule 11 from
those that fall short. District courts have been left to piece together
sparse decisions like Nisenbaum and NITEL and are struggling to find
consistency. The district courts, as a result, seem to be creating their
own tests. Knapp proposed that Rule 11 sanctions can be sought “only
on the grounds set forth in the letter.”205 The court “may not consider
any grounds set forth in the motion that were not articulated in the
letter…”206 In Momo Enters., LLC v. Banco Popular of N. Am., the
Northern District of Illinois decided that substantial compliance is met
where parties are provided “an opportunity to correct their purported

202

Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc. 15 C 754, 2017 WL 3668165 at *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug.
24, 2017) (citing Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 552).
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errors.”207 But the district court, much like the Seventh Circuit,
struggled to provide any criteria for what an “opportunity to correct”
involves.208
Judge Hamilton’s warning that reliance on a substantial
compliance is inviting “possible en banc and/or Supreme Court”
review indicates that the issue is ripe for a deeper look.209 Between the
slanted circuit split and the lack of guidance the Seventh Circuit has
provided to the district courts on this issue, substantial compliance will
likely come under review again.
B. The Future of Rule 11(c)(2) in the Seventh Circuit
If the Seventh Circuit is presented with a case that allows it to
address the merits of substantial compliance in the future, it will need
to consider a variety of factors in deciding the fate of the substantial
compliance rule.
1. The Case for Strict Compliance
One factor tilting against substantial compliance is its failure to
adhere to the plain language requirements of Rule 11. It is undeniable,
as many circuits have pointed out, that Rule 11(c)(2) requires motion a
motion to be served in order to trigger the 21 day safe harbor
requirement.210

207

Momo Enters., LLC v. Banco Popular of N. Am., No. 15-cv-11074, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161827 at *8-9 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2017) (holding that a party’s
motion for sanctions did not substantially comply with Rule 11 when it was served
10 months before moving for sanctions after summary judgment).
208
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NITEL, 850 F.3d at 889 n.5.
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See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 768
(6th Cir. 2014) (discussing the breadth of the circuit split against substantial
compliance and identifying cases in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th circuits that
have held informal letters without a motion are insufficient to trigger the 21 day safe
harbor period because they do not strictly comply with Rule 11).
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Further, a commitment to substantial compliance, especially a
poorly defined version of substantial compliance, can increase the use
of abusive litigation tactics by attorneys. The dramatic increase in
sanctions in the 1980’s highlighted the downside of a legal system that
allowed frequent, burdensome sanctioning.211 The 1983 version of the
Rule 11 allowed sanctions to become “a favorite weapon in litigators’
briefcases, often used and even more often brandished to threaten.”212
Attorneys are more likely to threaten sanctions as a litigation tactic if
the threat can be executed at no cost through an informal letter.
Other reasons to overturn substantial compliance precedent align
with the arguments that motivated the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11.
Arguably, the substantial compliance rule is more likely to chill
attorney creativity and zealousness in pursuing novel arguments.213 If
the ease of triggering sanctions is increased, attorneys may be more
hesitant to commit to some claims and be more cautious in pursuing to
some arguments. This effect would be compounded if substantial
compliance rests on uneasy footing with unclear criteria. Additionally,
a commitment to substantial compliance could generate more satellite
litigation than adherence to strict compliance of Rule 11. In the long
term, informal notice of sanctions will likely generate more Rule 11
hearings which can be costly and time consuming.
A key argument against strict compliance is that it is unnecessarily
formalistic and costly.214 Filing a motion to trigger the safe harbor
requirement does increase the financial burden to the party at the
wrong end of an improper filing. Arguably, there is a financial
disincentive for aggrieved parties to move for sanctions. The court
reserves the right, however, to demand a “for cause” showing of a
proper purpose if it so wishes.215 On the court's own initiative, it may
“order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct . . .
211

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
NITEL, 850 F.3d at 885.
213
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
214
NITEL, 850 F.3d at 887; Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804,
808 (7th Cir. 2003).
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has not violated Rule 11(b).”216 The court can enact sanctions sua
sponte if it so desires.217 Therefore, an aggrieved party may not need
to pay the costs for a motion where a filing is particularly egregious.218
Additionally, an aggrieved party that is confident that an opposing
party’s filing is improper will be reimbursed if sanctions are
determined to be warranted by the district court judge.219 The court has
the discretion to “award to the prevailing party the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred” for a Rule 11 hearing.220
2. The Case for Substantial Compliance
There seems to be some merit behind substantial compliance once
the plain meaning of Rule 11(c)(2) is set aside. According to the Rule
11(c)(1), “[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may
impose an appropriate sanction. . . .”221 If looking simply at the
general mandate of Rule 11, substantial compliance may be sufficient.
One of the most persuasive arguments against the strict
compliance interpretation of Rule 11 is the inherent conflict it creates
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. Rule 1 defines the scope and
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.222 The rules, it sets
forth, “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”223 Rule 11 contradicts
216

Id.
Douglas R. Richmond, Alternative Sanctions in Litigation, 47 N.M. L. Rev.
2019, 215-16 (2017) (discussing the court’s power to impose sanctions on its own
initiative, which requires a higher standard for sanctions, but reduces the risk that
attorneys will bring claims with an improper purpose knowing opposing party might
be unwilling to undertake extra costs).
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Rule 1. The rules should be administered to ensure “speedy”
proceedings.224 By requiring 21 days safe harbor before allowing a
motion for sanctions to be filed, it artificially slows down the
proceedings for at least three weeks. Another area of contradiction is
the instruction that the rules should be construed to ensure that
proceedings are “inexpensive.”225 Strict compliance with Rule 11
increases the financial demand on the threatening party. By requiring
an official motion, Rule 11 increases attorney fees and filing costs for
the party who is being wronged. Substantial compliance theory is
consistent with Rule 1. In comparison, strict compliance is arguably
unnecessarily formalistic and contrary to the scope and purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Though the Rule 11(c)(2) is widely accepted and often celebrated,
it is not without flaws. One of the main arguments against the safe
harbor provision is that it increases short-term costs and burdens on
the aggrieved party. The safe harbor provision provides attorneys a
second chance at recertification that was previously unprecedented.
Additionally, the security provided by the safe harbor requirement
may reduce the quality of attorney pleadings and motions. Attorneys
may be more cavalier when presenting filings to the court. They may
be more willing to take a risk, knowing that they can retreat if the
filing is challenged by the opposing party. By reducing the threat of
sanctions, attorneys may be less likely to conduct reasonable inquiry
into their clients’ claims, which is a core facet of Rule 11.
V. CONCLUSION
The outstanding question that remains for the Seventh Circuit to
address is whether its substantial compliance interpretation can be
crafted in a way that avoids the ills sought to be addressed by the
1983 Amendments. It is unclear whether there is a middle ground
between the Seventh Circuit’s poorly supported substantial
compliance interpretation and Rule 11(c)(2). Notably, substantial
224
225
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compliance is not mere or minimal compliance. The outcomes in
Matrix and NITEL show that not every party that moves for sanctions
will be successful. Substantial compliance is still a relatively high bar.
But, all in all, it is important to remember that the key goal for
Rule 11 is deterrence, not punishment.226 The evolution of Rule 11
conforms that sanctions are not meant to be punitive. The arguments in
support of the Seventh Circuit’s substantial compliance interpretation
of Rule 11(c)(2) are not persuasive enough to ignore the plain
language of the rule that says a motion must be served on the opposing
party. The emergence of a drastic circuit split and the Seventh
Circuit’s hesitance to clearly define what exactly substantial
compliance with Rule 11(c)(2) should look like do not bode well for
substantial compliance’s future. The legal system does not often allow
second chances, but Rule 11 is an important exception. Rule 11
sanctions exist to enhance the quality of pleadings, motions, and other
papers. A softer, more flexible rule that allows for a warning shot and
safe harbor is more consistent with the intent and purpose of the rule
than the alternative.
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